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Just a Miner Threat? The Fourth Circuit Refuses to Review 




Finality. The concept manifests in many forms. In the practice of law, 
finality functions as the golden rule of appeal. Federal courts of appeal may 
only review lower courts’ decisions if those decisions are final.1 Given that 
courts of appeal “are courts of limited jurisdiction,”2 the Constitution or a 
statute must expressly grant appellate jurisdiction.3 If the statute granting 
jurisdiction only allows review of final decisions, the million dollar 
question becomes this: What is a final decision? At first blush, the answer 
appears obvious. The Supreme Court has defined a final decision as “one 
‘by which a district court disassociates itself from a case.’”4 But this 
definition is incomplete. Based on a “practical rather than a technical 
construction [of 28 U.S.C. § 1291],”5 the Court has broadened its definition 
of final to include a small class of collateral orders that do not end the 
litigation.6 This concept—broadening the concept of finality to encompass 
a small class of collateral orders—is widely known as the collateral order 
doctrine.7  
This Note explores the ability of appellate courts to review temporary 
reinstatement orders issued by the Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission (Commission) under the collateral order doctrine. These 
unique orders require mine operators to temporarily reinstate terminated 
miners pending the outcome of the miners’ discrimination complaint filed 
with the Secretary of Labor (Secretary). The Supreme Court has never 
addressed whether temporary reinstatement orders are reviewable under the 
doctrine,8 and as a result of the Fourth Circuit’s 2014 decision Cobra 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 2. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (citing Swint v. 
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).  
 5. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 6. Id.  
 7. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc., 558 U.S. at 106. 
 8. See Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 
82, 88 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit’s consideration of the 
novel issue “are of limited persuasive effect”).  
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Natural Resources, LLC, v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission, a circuit split now exists on the subject.9 If the Supreme Court 
considers the split, it should hold that temporary reinstatements are 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.  
Part II of this Note discusses the collateral order doctrine’s origins, the 
evolution and purpose of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 
and the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ application of the doctrine to 
temporary reinstatement orders. Part III analyzes the facts, holding, and 
majority and dissenting opinions of the Fourth Circuit’s decision. Part IV 
argues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision is unjustified because it 
exaggerated the impact of a tolling affirmative defense, construed the 
doctrine’s severability requirement too narrowly, and failed to consider the 
entire class of orders before rendering its decision.  
II. Law Before Cobra: The Collateral Order Doctrine, the Mine Act, and 
Temporary Reinstatement Orders 
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine: Origins and Development 
The collateral order doctrine first emerged in the Supreme Court’s 1949 
opinion Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation.10 In Cohen, the 
Court encountered a novel jurisdictional question: Did it have the authority 
to review a district court’s refusal to apply a New Jersey statute in a 
diversity suit?11 Although the district court’s decision was not final, the 
Court nonetheless held that it was reviewable because it fell within the 
“small class which finally determine[s] claims of right[s] separable from, 
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied 
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”12  
The Supreme Court’s analysis centered on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
which governs appeals of final district court decisions.13 The statute states 
that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all 
final decisions of the district courts . . . .”14 Rather than construing this 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. at 88 n.11, 92 (acknowledging that by holding temporary reinstatement orders 
unreviewable under the collateral order doctrine, the court’s decision was contrary to both 
the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits decisions on the matter).  
 10. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 11. Id. at 543-45. 
 12. Id. at 546.  
 13. Id. at 545. 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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language strictly, the Court acknowledged that the statute receives a 
“practical rather than a technical construction.”15 Thus, the collateral order 
doctrine emerged as a broader interpretation of finality, not as an exception 
to the finality requirement.16  
The Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for the collateral order 
doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.17 To fall within the scope of the 
doctrine, an order must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, 
[2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”18 The Court construes the test strictly, often emphasizing that 
“the ‘narrow’ exception should . . . never be allowed to swallow the general 
rule . . . .”19 When applying the doctrine, a court must not “engage in an 
‘individualized jurisdictional inquiry’”20 but rather consider “the ‘entire 
category [of orders] to which a claim belongs.’”21 The doctrine’s narrow 
construction prevents “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . [that] 
encroach[] upon the prerogatives of district court judges.”22 
The most contentious aspect of the doctrine’s analysis is determining 
whether a particular interest advanced by a category of orders is sufficiently 
important to qualify for review.23 The Court has considered only a handful 
of interests sufficiently important, applying the collateral order doctrine to a 
criminal defendant’s appeal of a double jeopardy claim in Abney v. United 
States,24 a former president’s appeal of an absolute immunity claim in 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,25 and a government official’s appeal of a qualified 
immunity claim in Mitchell v. Forsyth.26 These cases focus on the 
doctrine’s third prong—effectively unreviewable on appeal. If an order 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
 16. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). 
 17. 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added). 
 20. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (quoting Coopers & 
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473). 
 21. Id. (citing Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868).  
 22. Id. at 106. 
 23. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 878-79 (noting that determining whether an 
interest satisfies the doctrine’s third prong “cannot be answered without a judgment about 
the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment 
requirement”). 
 24. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 25. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 26. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
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forcing a person with a valid double jeopardy, qualified immunity, or 
absolute immunity defense to stand trial is not immediately appealable, that 
person’s claim would effectively be lost.27 In each case, the interests 
protected outweighed any dangers associated with immediate review.28 
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Administrative Decisions  
Because the collateral order doctrine is a product of the construction 
given to 28 U.S.C. § 1291—the statute governing an appellate court’s 
ability to review final district court decisions—the doctrine’s applicability 
to administrative decisions is questionable.29 The First Circuit, however, 
held in Rhode Island v. EPA that the collateral order doctrine can be used to 
review administrative procedures.30  
The First Circuit proffered three reasons for its decision.31 First, drawing 
on a trilogy of then-recent Supreme Court cases, the First Circuit concluded 
that the Supreme Court had illustrated its willingness to apply the doctrine 
to administrative proceedings.32 Given what the First Circuit perceived to 
be a clear signpost erected by the Supreme Court, it stated that it would be 
“loath to strike off in a different direction.”33 Second, the First Circuit noted 
that the policy implications did not support the adoption of “a wholly 
different rule of finality to review . . . agency determinations.”34 Finally, the 
First Circuit reasoned that a contrary finding would create a split with the 
circuits that had applied the doctrine to review administrative decisions.35  
                                                                                                                 
 27. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350-51 (2006). 
 28. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (noting that a fundamental attribute of immunity is the 
“entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation”); Nixon, 457 U.S. at 
751 (noting that allowing an immediate appeal of absolute immunity claims would insure 
that a president would not be distracted by the possibility of a costly private lawsuit); Abney, 
431 U.S. at 660-61 (noting that the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a 
criminal defendant from being tried twice, not just sentenced twice, for the same crime). 
 29. Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 23-25. 
 32. Id. (noting that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976), FTC v. Standard 
Oil, 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980), and Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778-79 (1983) 
supported the application of the doctrine to administrative proceedings because the Court 
concluded that an administrative order could be considered final for review, applied the 
collateral order doctrine to review an administrative proceeding, and noted the possibility of 
applying the doctrine to review a non-final agency decision, respectively).  
 33. Id. at 24.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 25 (noting that the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have invoked the doctrine to review administrative decisions). 
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C. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 
By passing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 
Congress sought to combat unsafe working conditions associated with mine 
operations.36 Although Congress had previously enacted legislation to 
address the safety of miners, it found that the Department of Interior, the 
agency responsible for administering those statutes, was “seriously 
deficient . . . in its enforcement and administrative responsibilities under 
these statutes.”37 Based on these findings, Congress streamlined the 
enforcement of the new comprehensive statute. It transferred the 
administration of the Mine Act to the Secretary of Labor, establishing the 
Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration within the Department of 
Labor. It created the Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the 
independent body charged with reviewing “orders, citations, and 
penalties,”38 and it also established procedures that allow miners to file 
complaints with the Secretary if discrimination occurs because of a safety 
complaint.39  
 By prohibiting mine operators from discharging or discriminating 
against miners who file safety complaints with the Secretary, the Mine Act 
facilitates enforcement of its provisions.40 When a miner files a 
discrimination complaint, two distinct processes occur.41 The first is a 
determination of the merits underlying the miner’s discrimination claim.42 
The second-and the primary subject of this Note-is the issuance of a 
temporary reinstatement order that restores the miner to his prior position.43 
1. The Merits Determination 
If a miner believes that a mine operator terminated or discriminated 
against him for engaging in a protected activity, such as reporting a health 
or safety violation, he may file a complaint with the Secretary within sixty 
days of the alleged violation.44 If the Secretary finds that the mine operator 
violated the terms of the Mine Act, the Secretary will immediately file a 
                                                                                                                 
 36. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). 
 37. S. REP. NO. 95-181, at 8 (1977). 
 38. Id. at 11. 
 39. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2). 
 40. Id. § 815(c)(1). 
 41. See id. § 815(c)(2).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
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complaint with the Commission.45 After the Commission provides an 
opportunity for a formal adjudicative hearing in compliance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act,46 it will issue an order “based upon findings 
of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary’s proposed 
order . . . .”47 Alternatively, if the Secretary finds that the mine operator did 
not violate the Mine Act, the miner may file a complaint directly with the 
Commission.48 The Commission will still provide an opportunity for an 
adjudicative hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and 
subsequently issue an order either dismissing or sustaining the miner’s 
complaint.49 
2. Temporary Reinstatement Orders 
In addition to constructing a merits-determination procedure, the Mine 
Act establishes a procedure by which terminated miners may temporarily be 
reinstated to their previous positions.50 After reviewing the miner’s 
complaint, if the Secretary concludes that the claim “was not frivolously 
brought,” the Commission will issue an order reinstating the miner pending 
the outcome of the miner’s complaint.51 Even if the Commission does not 
issue a temporary reinstatement order, the Secretary must still investigate 
the underlying discrimination claim.52  
Although the Mine Act does not address adjudicative hearings on 
temporary reinstatement orders, the Commission has promulgated 
regulations that allow for such a hearing before an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) at the mine operator’s request.53 If a mine operator requests a 
hearing, the inquiry is limited to whether the miner’s claim was frivolously 
brought.54 It is neither the ALJ’s nor the Commission’s duty to resolve the 
merits of the discrimination claim at the temporary reinstatement phase.55  
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. 
 46. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012). 
 47. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2). 
 48. Id. § 815(c)(3). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. § 815(c)(2). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 
84 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 53. Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 920 F.2d 738, 
740 (11th Cir. 1990) (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 2700.44(b) (1990)). 
 54. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Nat. Res., 
LLC, 35 FMSHRC 394 (2013). 
 55. Id. 
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As the name suggests, temporary reinstatement orders do not 
permanently reinstate a miner and may be terminated or expire in three 
circumstances. First, if the Secretary fails to file a discrimination complaint 
with the Commission within ninety days of receiving a miner’s complaint, 
an ALJ may dissolve the temporary reinstatement order.56 Similarly, if after 
the investigation, the Secretary concludes that the mine operator did not 
violate the provisions of the Mine Act, an ALJ may dissolve the order.57 
Finally, certain economic circumstances, such as layoff or a reduction in 
workforce, may toll the mine operator’s obligation to provide back pay to a 
terminated worker.58 In these circumstances, the terminated miner would 
only collect back pay up until the time the mine operator would have 
terminated him absent the discriminatory treatment.59 All ALJ decisions on 
temporary reinstatement orders are subject to the Commission’s 
discretionary review.60 
3. Judicial Review of Final Commission Orders 
Section 816 of the Mine Act allows a party “adversely affected or 
aggrieved by an order of the Commission” to seek review of the order “in 
any United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation is 
alleged to have occurred. . . .”61 Although the statute’s text does not 
specifically limit appellate review to final Commission orders, the Supreme 
Court presumes that “judicial review will be available only when agency 
action becomes final.”62 Based on this presumption, several circuit courts 
have held that the Mine Act’s language restricts appellate review to final 
Commission decisions.63 That said, appellate courts wait until the 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 920 F.2d at 741 (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 2700.44(f)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., 
31 FMSHRC 1050, 1054 (2009). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 
84 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 61. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1) (2012). 
 62. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983).  
 63. See Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1048 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the Mine Act’s legislative history illustrates Congress’s intent 
to allow review of final Commission orders); Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 920 F.2d 738, 743 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Although the statute uses the 
term ‘order’ rather than ‘final order,’ this omission alone is insufficient to overcome the 
general presumption that judicial review of administrative actions is available only when 
such decisions have become final.”); Monterey Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 635 F.2d 291, 292 (4th Cir. 1980) (“The statute, amplified by this 
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Commission issues an order that “imposes an obligation, denies a right, or 
fixes some legal relationship, usually at the consummation of an 
administrative process.”64 
D. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Temporary Reinstatement Orders 
Because temporary reinstatement orders technically are not final agency 
actions, the collateral order doctrine has emerged as a means to review the 
orders.65 Before the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Cobra, both the Eleventh 
and Seventh Circuits considered whether the doctrine allowed appellate 
courts to review temporary reinstatement orders in Jim Walter Resources, 
Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission66 and Vulcan 
Construction Materials v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission,67 respectively. Both concluded that it did. 
1. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
In Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission, the Eleventh Circuit held that a temporary reinstatement order 
was appealable via the collateral order doctrine.68 Jim Walter Resources, 
Inc. terminated two miners, both elected safety committeemen,69 because  
  
                                                                                                                 
legislative history, demonstrates congressional intent that only final Commission orders 
should be reviewed.”). 
 64. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 59 F.3d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Alaska v. FERC, 980 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).  
 65. See Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 85-86 (referencing the collateral order 
doctrine to determine whether a temporary reinstatement order was considered final for 
judicial review); Vulcan Constr. Materials v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
700 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that although temporary reinstatement orders are 
not final agency actions, jurisdiction is still proper through the collateral order doctrine); Jim 
Walter Res., Inc., 920 F.2d at 739 (reserving the question of whether temporary 
reinstatement orders are final agency actions because jurisdiction was proper under the 
collateral order doctrine). 
 66. 920 F.2d 738.  
 67. 700 F.3d 297. 
 68. 920 F.2d at 738-39.  
 69. “Safety committeemen are elected by the miners and have wide-ranging 
responsibilities for insuring mine safety, including inspection and notification duties under 
federal mine safety laws, handling of all safety grievances under the collective bargaining 
agreement, and the reporting of all mine hazards to management.” Id. at 741. 
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they failed to comply with a mandatory drug screening.70 Both miners had 
filed numerous safety complaints with management throughout their tenure 
as safety committeemen.71 They believed their supervisor used the drug 
screening policy as a way to terminate the miners for their active 
enforcement of safety procedures.72 After the miners filed a discrimination 
complaint with the Secretary, an ALJ determined that they did not 
frivolously bring the claims and ordered the mine operator to reinstate 
them.73 Jim Walter Resources appealed the temporary reinstatement order 
to the Eleventh Circuit.74 
Rather than deciding whether temporary reinstatement orders were 
technically final agency actions, the Eleventh Circuit instead found that 
jurisdiction was proper under the collateral order doctrine.75 The court 
determined that a temporary reinstatement order satisfied the doctrine’s first 
prong because it “is a ‘fully consummated’ decision, and there are literally 
‘no further steps’ that JWR [Jim Walter Resources] can take in order to 
avoid the Commission’s order at the agency level.”76 Regardless of the 
potential for factual overlap between the temporary reinstatement order 
decision and the discrimination decision, the court concluded the doctrine’s 
second prong was satisfied because the two determinations are conceptually 
distinct.77 Temporary reinstatement orders determine whether the miner’s 
claim is frivolous, while the merits determination considers “whether there 
is sufficient evidence of discrimination to justify permanent 
reinstatement.”78 Finally, the court found that the doctrine’s final prong was 
satisfied because a court reviewing an appeal from the final merits 
determination would not need to consider harms from the temporary 
reinstatement order.79 Essentially, the aggrieved party would be without 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 742. 
 71. Id. at 741.  
 72. Id. at 742. Both the miners were subject to harassment about the drug screening 
policy after one of them notified management that he was unable to provide a urine sample 
with others watching. Id. This harassment and ridicule kept both miners from producing a 
urine sample on the day of their scheduled drug screening. Id. The following day, both 
miners had a drug screening at a medical facility. Id. Neither miner tested positive for any 
illegal substance. Id. Jim Walter Resources refused to accept the test results. Id. at 741-42. 
 73. Id. at 742-43. 
 74. Id. at 743. 
 75. Id. at 744-45. 
 76. Id. at 744 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 745. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
94 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:85 
 
 
“any opportunity for a judicial hearing of its claims [as to the temporary 
reinstatement order].”80 After establishing jurisdiction through the doctrine, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the miners’ claims were not frivolous 
and affirmed the temporary reinstatement order.81 Thus, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision established precedent to support the collateral order 
doctrine’s application to temporary reinstatement orders.  
2. Vulcan Construction Materials v. Federal Mine Safety & Health 
Review Commission 
In Vulcan Construction Materials v. Federal Mine Safety & Health 
Review Commission, the Seventh Circuit also held that a temporary 
reinstatement order was appealable through the collateral order doctrine, 
albeit in a much briefer analysis.82 A miner filed a discrimination complaint 
with the Secretary alleging that Vulcan Construction Material, the mine 
operator, terminated him for engaging in a protected safety-related 
activity.83 After determining that the miner did not frivolously bring the 
claim, the Secretary applied to the Commission for a temporary 
reinstatement order.84 Upon further investigation, the Secretary concluded 
that no discrimination occurred.85 Based on the Secretary’s findings, 
Vulcan moved to dissolve the order, but the ALJ denied the request.86 
Vulcan then filed for Commission review of the ALJ’s denial of the 
motion.87 A divided Commission upheld the ALJ’s decision to deny the 
motion.88 Vulcan then appealed the Commission’s decision to the Seventh 
Circuit.89 
Echoing the analysis from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jim Walter 
Resources, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine’s 
three prongs were satisfied.90 First, the court noted that the Commission’s 
decision regarding the motion to dissolve the order was conclusive.91 
Second, the court held that because the motion’s dissolution depended on 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 751. 
 82. 700 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 83. Id. at 299. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 300. 
 91. Id. 
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an interpretation of the Mine Act, it was separate from the underlying 
discrimination complaint.92 Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an 
appeal of the merits decision would not require a court to review the 
temporary reinstatement order, which would deprive the mine operator of 
the opportunity to dispute the order.93 While the Seventh Circuit’s 
discussion of the collateral order doctrine is concise, it ultimately 
strengthened the validity of the Jim Walter Resources holding.  
III. Cobra Natural Resources, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health 
Review Commission: A Turning Point 
The Fourth Circuit deviated from its sister circuits in Cobra by refusing 
to review a temporary reinstatement order through the collateral order 
doctrine.94 
A. Facts 
Russell Ratliff, an underground equipment operator, began working at a 
Cobra-operated mine in Wharncliff, West Virginia, in June of 2008.95 
Following the Upper Big Branch mine disaster in April of 2010, which 
claimed the lives of twenty-nine miners in Montcoal, West Virginia,96 
Cobra instituted a policy requiring a mandatory safety meeting at the 
beginning of each shift.97 During the October 9, 2012, daily safety meeting, 
Ratliff spoke out about the prominent ventilation problems in the mine.98 
Specifically, Ratliff stated that the cut cycle was unsafe because it required 
the miners to breathe dust particles, which causes significant health risks.99 
Over the next week, Ratliff submitted several anonymous “Running Right” 
cards, a system by which miners could notify the mine operator of any 
safety concerns.100 Cobra terminated Ratliff on October 17, 2012, citing 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (citing Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 920 
F.2d 738, 745 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
 94. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 
92 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 95. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Nat. Res., 
LLC, 35 FMSHRC 101, 105 (2013). 
 96. Clement Daly, Four Years Since the Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster, WORLD 
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/04/05/ubba-
a05.html. 
 97. Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 106. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
96 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:85 
 
 
poor attitude and work performance.101 Ratliff contended that Cobra 
terminated him because of his numerous safety complaints.102 He 
subsequently filed a discrimination complaint with the Secretary.103 
After finding that Ratliff did not frivolously bring the discrimination 
claim, the Secretary applied to the Commission for a temporary 
reinstatement order.104 Cobra requested a hearing, which was set for 
January 7, 2013. At the hearing Cobra alleged that Ratliff’s claim was 
frivolous given his history of insubordination.105 Additionally, Cobra 
contended that because it would have laid off Ratliff on January 15, 2013, 
three months after he was terminated, the reinstatement order should be 
tolled to that date.106 But the ALJ rejected the tolling affirmative defense, 
found that the claim was not frivolously brought, and directed Cobra to 
reinstate Ratliff.107 Cobra then requested review of the temporary 
reinstatement order by the Commission.108 The Commission subsequently 
upheld the ALJ’s decision in the temporary reinstatement hearing.109 Cobra 
subsequently sought review by the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the 
collateral order doctrine gave the court jurisdiction.110 
B. Procedural History, Issue, and Holding 
Rather than deciding whether the Commission erred in rejecting Cobra’s 
tolling argument, the Fourth Circuit focused on the threshold question of 
whether the collateral order doctrine allowed it to exercise jurisdiction over 
the case.111 Although both parties conceded that the court had jurisdiction, 
the Fourth Circuit, in a 2–1 decision, held that an interlocutory review of 
the Commission’s order was not proper because the order did not satisfy the 
three requirements of the collateral order doctrine.112 
  
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. at 104. 
 102. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82, 
84 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Ratliff, 35 FMSHRC at 104-05. 
 106. Id. at 117. 
 107. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 85. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. ex rel. Ratliff v. Cobra Nat. Res., 35 
FMSHRC 394 (2013). 
 110. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 83.  
 111. Id. at 92. 
 112. Id. at 85. 
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C. The Majority’s Decision  
 The Fourth Circuit began its analysis with an emphasis on the three 
most recent Supreme Court opinions discussing the doctrine: Will v. 
Hallock, Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc., and 
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter. The court used these cases to attack 
the persuasiveness of both the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ decisions on 
the issue.113 The court contended that because Jim Walter Resources was 
decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Will, Digital Equipment, 
and Mohawk Industries, it was not consistent with the “narrow and limited 
scope of the collateral order doctrine” intended by the Supreme Court.114 In 
a similar fashion, the Fourth Circuit quickly dismissed the Seventh Circuit’s 
jurisdictional analysis in Vulcan as too brief to be convincing.115  
Unencumbered by the weight of the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit 
opinions, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to analyze each of the collateral 
order doctrine’s three prongs and ultimately concluded that none were 
satisfied.116 For the Fourth Circuit, the doctrine’s first prong—whether an 
order “conclusively determine[s] a disputed question”—was not met 
because an ALJ can review and modify a temporary reinstatement order if 
the mine operator raises a successful tolling defense.117 The court reasoned 
that an ALJ’s ability to revisit and modify the order prevented it from truly 
being conclusive.118 The court also used the presence of a tolling defense to 
distinguish the facts in Cobra from those in Jim Walter Resources. In the 
former, the mine operator asserted a tolling defense; in the latter, the 
operator did not.119 Therefore, the presence of a tolling defense in Cobra 
rendered the order “expressly held open for the possibility of 
reconsideration,” which would fail the doctrine’s first requirement.120 
In a similar manner, the court found that the doctrine’s second prong—
whether an order “resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from 
the merits of the action,”—was also not satisfied.121 While acknowledging  
  
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 88. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 88-92. 
 117. Id. at 88-89.  
 118. Id. at 89. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (citing Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)). 
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that the miner’s burden of proof is significantly lower at the temporary-
reinstatement-order stage, the court nonetheless held that review of the 
collateral order would overlap too significantly with the final merits 
determination to satisfy the doctrine’s second requirement.122 As the Fourth 
Circuit phrased it, “[A] temporary reinstatement analysis is simply a highly 
deferential look at the same basic facts and factors that ultimately control 
the outcome of the miner’s claim.”123 Put simply, because “the 
considerations involved in the temporary reinstatement process are deeply 
enmeshed with the factual and legal issues comprising the miner’s 
underlying discrimination claim,” the order failed the severability 
requirement of the second prong.124 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the doctrine’s third prong—
whether the order would be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment”—mirrored that of the previous two prongs.125 An 
unreviewable order “has significant and irreparable effects” or impacts 
“rights that would be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate 
appeal.”126 Relying on a handful of Supreme Court cases that invoked the 
doctrine, the Fourth Circuit determined that Cobra’s economic injury did 
not fall within the scope of interest typically protected under the doctrine.127 
The interests common to collateral order doctrine analysis include 
presidential, sovereign, or qualified immunity claims or cases involving the 
rights of criminal defendants.128 Ultimately, the court held that because “a 
coal operator’s economic interest do[es] not begin to approach the 
importance of several interests . . . that the Supreme Court has deemed” 
reviewable under the doctrine,” the temporary reinstatement order failed 
this third and final prong.129 At bottom, because the majority held that the 
prongs of the collateral order doctrine were not met, the Fourth Circuit held 
it lacked power to review the case. One judge disagreed. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 90. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citing Will, 546 U.S. at 349).  
 126. Id. (quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985)). 
 127. Id. at 91.  
 128. Id. at 91-92. 
 129. Id. at 92. 
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D. The Dissent  
Judge Agee argued that temporary reinstatement orders are reviewable 
under § 816 of the Mine Act rather than through the collateral order 
doctrine.130 From his perspective, denying review of the order would create 
unreviewable harm for the mine operator for three reasons.131 First, Cobra’s 
arguments against the temporary reinstatement order would be moot by the 
time the Commission decided the merits of Ratliff’s discrimination 
claim.132 Second, refusing review of these orders would preclude a mine 
operator from recovering the wages paid during the reinstatement period 
because no administrative procedure exists for this recovery.133 Finally, 
allowing a disgruntled employee back into the work force could cause a 
major disruption in the working environment.134 In sum, not allowing 
review of this order would deprive the mine operator of the ability “to 
correct a mistaken agency decision below.”135 But the mine operator is not 
the only one harmed. 
In a similar vein, Judge Agee pointed to harm suffered by a miner if 
review is denied.136 When a miner is denied a temporary reinstatement 
order, the unavailability of judicial review may “defeat the Mine Act’s 
enforcement mechanisms and, in turn, the Congressional intent in adopting 
this legislation.”137  
Moving beyond his first argument, Judge Agee then considered whether 
the collateral order doctrine allowed for appellate review of temporary 
reinstatement orders.138 Agee took issue with the majority’s focus on the 
Commission’s discretion to toll the reinstatement order.139 He emphasized 
that “an order can be conclusive even if there is some possibility that the 
tribunal below will reconsider.”140 Judge Agee also noted that, in this case 
specifically, “The ALJ spoke in unequivocal terms and ordered Cobra to 
provide ‘immediate reinstatement’ to Ratliff.”141 He then pointed out that in 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 93 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 95. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 96. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 97. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 98. 
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spite of the majority’s argument to the contrary, the “Supreme Court 
accepts some ‘factual overlap’ in the collateral order context.”142 
Additionally, he argued, because a temporary reinstatement order has no 
impact on the final resolution of the discrimination claim, the order would 
satisfy the severability requirement.143 
Finally, rather than focusing on the specific economic impact faced by 
Cobra (as the majority had), the dissent framed the importance of the 
interest at stake in much broader terms.144 Judge Agee stated that when a 
mine operator, like Cobra, appeals the Commission’s decision to reinstate a 
worker, “it faces the prospect of paying unjustified money to a miner, 
reinstating a problematic worker, or facing legally unsustainable procedures 
below.”145 Conversely, when a miner appeals the Commission’s denial of a 
reinstatement order, “he wishes to vindicate his right to much-needed 
contemporary payment and a fair process below.”146 These interests, he 
concluded, fall within the scope of the interests typically protected in the 
doctrine’s third prong analysis.147 Ultimately, Judge Agee came the correct 
conclusion: temporary reinstatement orders should be reviewable.  
IV. Analysis 
The Fourth Circuit’s drastic departure from the Eleventh and Seventh 
Circuits’ opinions is unwarranted. The majority places too much emphasis 
on the ability of a mine operator to assert a tolling defense, narrowly 
construes the severability requirement of the doctrine, and fails to consider 
the consequences of denying review of temporary reinstatement orders as a 
whole.  
A. Tolling the Impact of the Tolling Affirmative Defense 
The majority’s attack on the conclusive characteristic of temporary 
reinstatement orders is two-fold.148 First, an ALJ’s ability to modify a 
temporary reinstatement order in light of a mine operator’s tolling defense 
prevents the orders from being conclusive.149 Second, because Jim Walter 
Resources was decided prior to the Commission’s 2009 ruling in Secretary 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 99. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 99-100. 
 148. Id. at 88-89. 
 149. Id. at 88. 
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of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration ex. rel Gatlin v. 
KenAmerican Resources, Inc.,150 which discussed an ALJ’s ability to 
modify a temporary reinstatement order in response to a tolling defense, 
Jim Walter Resources is no longer relevant law.151  
The two cases cited by the Fourth Circuit in support of its first 
argument—Swint v. Chambers County Commission,152 and Jamison v. 
Wiley,153—are factually distinguishable from Cobra Natural Resources, 
LLC.154 In both cases, an appellate court refused to review a district court 
decision through the collateral order doctrine because the judge intended to 
review and modify his initial decision.155 The key factual distinction is that 
in both cases, the district court judge unequivocally expressed an intention 
to return to the particular disputed issue.156 But here, as Judge Agee noted 
in his dissent, the ALJ in Cobra never indicated any intent to return to the 
temporary reinstatement order.157 Plainly, these cases shed no light on the 
availability of collateral order doctrine review when the presiding judge, be 
it an ALJ or a federal district judge, has the discretion to review a decision 
but has not expressed an intention to do so. At best, the Fourth Circuit’s 
cited authority supports the idea that if an ALJ expresses an intention to 
review and modify a temporary reinstatement order, then the order cannot 
be conclusive. Regardless of the proposition’s soundness, it is inapplicable 
to the facts of Cobra.  
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit’s argument that the Commission’s 
Gatlin decision represents a turning point in the availability of the tolling 
defense is unfounded. Despite the crystal-clear precedent contained within 
the Commission’s opinion, the Fourth Circuit mischaracterizes Gatlin as the 
first Commission opinion to discuss the tolling defense. This is startling 
because Gatlin cites previous Commission decisions where the tolling 
                                                                                                                 
 150. 31 FMSHRC 1050 (2009). 
 151. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 89. 
 152. 514 U.S. 35 (1995). 
 153. 14 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 154. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 97-98 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 155. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 39 (1995) (noting that the district 
court denied a defendant’s motion for reconsideration on a motion for summary judgment 
but expressed an intention to revisit the decision prior to the jury deliberations); Jamison v. 
Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 230 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that when the district court ruled on a 
substitution motion, it noted that the decision was only temporary). 
 156. Swint, 514 U.S. at 39; Jamison, 14 F.3d at 230. 
 157. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 98 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“The ALJ spoke in 
unequivocal terms and ordered Cobra to provide ‘immediate reinstatement’ to Ratliff.”). 
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defense was both recognized and applied.158 The idea that Jim Walters 
Resources is obsolete due to the “emergence” of the tolling defense is 
contradicted by Gatlin itself. The Gatlin decision cites the Commission’s 
decision, affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in Jim Walter Resources, as 
authority on the subject of temporary reinstatement orders.159 In sum, 
Gatlin did not change the legal landscape for temporary reinstatement 
orders; rather, it affirmed a long-standing concept. The alternative 
interpretation of the decision advanced by the Fourth Circuit does not pass 
muster. 
B. Six Degrees of Separation? 
The Cobra majority employs an unnecessarily restricted interpretation of 
the doctrine’s second requirement that is inconsistent with existing 
Supreme Court precedent. In the majority’s view, temporary reinstatement 
orders do not meet the collateral order doctrine’s second requirement 
because “a temporary reinstatement analysis is simply a highly deferential 
look at the same basic facts and factors that ultimately control the outcome 
of the miner’s claim.”160 Citing its own precedent on the doctrine’s second 
prong, the Fourth Circuit underplays the two very different burdens of proof 
between a temporary reinstatement order and a miner’s claim by arguing 
that the “factual and legal issues” of each procedure are “deeply 
enmeshed.”161 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis is problematic because it 
essentially ignores the Supreme Court’s prior discussion of the 
“severability” principle of the doctrine, particularly in Mitchell v. 
Forsyth.162 As the Mitchell dissent aptly noted, the Supreme Court has 
shown a willingness to allow factual overlap with the doctrine, especially 
when qualified or absolute immunity is involved.163 In spite of this Supreme 
Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit relied on its own precedent which holds 
that the second prong is not satisfied when there is a “threat of substantial 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Sec’y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health ex rel Gatlin v. KenAmerican Res., Inc., 31 
FMSHRC 1050, 1054 (2009) (listing Commission decisions from 1940, 1984, 1985, and 
1989 all advocating for the tolling of a terminated employee’s back pay or reinstatement 
when a reduction in workforce was shown).  
 159. See id. (citing Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
920 F.2d 738 (11th Cir. 1990)) (describing the burden of proof and scope of temporary 
reinstatement orders). 
 160. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 90. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
 163. Id. at 527-28; Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 98. 
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duplication of judicial decision making . . . .”164 Because this language 
requires a strict separation of the issues when one is not required by 
Mitchell, this narrow construction of the second prong is inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s clear decision to allow overlap between the collateral 
order decision and the final merits determination.  
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis could be more persuasive with a different 
line of argument. Rather than downplaying the conceptual distinction 
between temporary reinstatement orders and the final merits determination, 
the Fourth Circuit should have decided that the Supreme Court’s recent 
trilogy of cases addressing the doctrine—Will, Mohawk Industries, and 
Digital Equipment—essentially abrogated the Court’s prior, more lenient 
interpretation of the second prong. The Supreme Court has not explicitly 
overturned Mitchell.165 However, the Court’s recent emphasis on a limited 
application of the doctrine could support the Fourth Circuit’s more narrow 
interpretation of the doctrine. By focusing on the burden of proof in the two 
distinct procedures rather than the evolution of the doctrine,166 the Fourth 
Circuit nearly sidesteps the issue. Without arguing that the doctrine has 
evolved in some manner, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation cannot be 
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s allowance of decisional overlap in 
Mitchell.  
C. The Interest at Stake: Looking at the Big Picture 
The majority’s argument regarding the doctrine’s third prong addresses 
both components of the requirement: the unavailability of review and the 
importance of the interest at stake.167 The majority essentially concedes 
that, as the coal operator appealing the temporary reinstatement orders, 
Cobra’s interest would not be re-dressable absent an appeal.168 The Fourth 
Circuit focused instead on the economic characteristics of the interests at 
stake.169 Ultimately, the court refused to review the temporary 
reinstatement  
  
                                                                                                                 
 164. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 89 (quoting Dickens v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 677 
F.2d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 91 (referencing the Court’s analysis in Mitchell). 
 166. Id. at 90. 
 167. Id. at 90-92. 
 168. Id. at 92. 
 169. Id. 
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order because “a coal operator’s financial interest in avoiding wage 
payments to a reinstated miner who returns to his job in the coal mines 
pales in comparison to those interests that have been deemed sufficiently 
important to give rise to collateral order jurisdiction.”170 This analysis is 
lacking. Because the Supreme Court requires a court to consider an entire 
class of orders when considering whether to allow a collateral order 
doctrine appeal,171 the Fourth Circuit erred by only considering the mine 
operator’s interests when deciding whether temporary reinstatement orders 
should be reviewable.  
1. Unavailability of Review 
Conceding that the mine operator’s interests would be unreviewable on 
appeal does not relieve the court of its obligation to consider the impact of 
its decision on the miner’s interests.172 By only analyzing the situation from 
the perspective of a mine operator’s appeal, the court fails to consider the 
equally probable scenario of a miner’s appeal of the Commission’s decision 
regarding a temporary reinstatement order. One way to illustrate the Fourth 
Circuit’s incomplete analysis is to consider what impact the court’s decision 
would have in all possible circumstances. Under the Mine Act, courts may 
only review final Commission orders.173 If temporary reinstatement orders 
are not considered final orders either under the Mine Act or through the 
application of the collateral order doctrine, four possible scenarios emerge. 
! Scenario One: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the 
Secretary. The Secretary finds that the miner’s claims were not 
frivolously brought and applies to the Commission for a temporary 
reinstatement order. The Commission grants the order. After an 
investigation, the Secretary finds that the mine operator violated the 
terms of the Mine Act and files a complaint with the Commission. 
After a hearing, the Commission finds the mine operator guilty of 
discrimination. The mine operator appeals the Commission’s final 
decision.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. 
 171. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). 
 172. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 99 (Agee, J., dissenting).  
 173. Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2004); Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety 
& Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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! Scenario Two: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the 
Secretary. The Secretary initially finds that the miner’s claims were 
frivolously brought and does not apply to the Commission for a 
temporary reinstatement order. After an investigation, however, the 
Secretary finds that the mine operator violated the terms of the 
Mine Act and files a complaint with the Commission. After a 
hearing, the Commission finds the mine operator guilty of 
discrimination. The mine operator appeals the Commission’s final 
decision.  
! Scenario Three: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the 
Secretary. The Secretary finds that the miner’s claims were not 
frivolously brought and applies to the Commission for a temporary 
reinstatement order. The Commission grants the order. After an 
investigation, however, the Secretary finds that the mine operator 
did not violate the terms of the Mine Act. The miner then files a 
complaint with the Commission on his own behalf. After a hearing, 
the Commission finds the mine operator not guilty of 
discrimination. The miner appeals the Commission’s final decision.  
! Scenario Four: A miner files a discrimination complaint with the 
Secretary. The Secretary finds that the miner’s claims were 
frivolously brought and does not apply to the Commission for a 
temporary reinstatement order. After an investigation, the Secretary 
finds that the mine operator did not violate the terms of the Mine 
Act. The miner then files a complaint with the Commission on his 
own behalf. After a hearing, the Commission finds the mine 
operator not guilty of discrimination. The miner appeals the 
Commission’s final decision.174  
  
                                                                                                                 
 174. Procedurally, scenarios Three and Four have two different avenues to the same 
outcome. Rather than the miner filing a complaint with the Commission his own behalf, the 
Secretary may find that there is enough evidence to warrant filing a complaint with the 
Commission. After the hearing, the Commission may vacate the Secretary’s finding of 
discrimination. Under either avenue, the result is the same: the mine operator is not guilty of 
discrimination and the miner appeals the Commission’s decision.  
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A. Scenarios Two and Three 
While temporary reinstatement orders do not merge with or impact the 
final discrimination decision, the ultimate discrimination decision does 
impact whether the party aggrieved by the temporary reinstatement order 
has the opportunity to present those arguments on appeal.175 In Scenarios 
Two and Three, the party injured by the temporary reinstatement order—
the miner in Scenario Two and the mine operator in Scenario Three—
ultimately receives a favorable Commission order. In either situation, the 
appealing party would have little, if any, incentive to appeal the 
Commission’s order only to address the grievances regarding the temporary 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 96 (Agee, J., dissenting) (highlighting that if 
temporary reinstatement orders are not considered final, “a miner’s appeal from an adverse 
decision on temporary reinstatement will now be foreclosed because the mine operator and 
the miner share equal appeal rights”).  
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reinstatement order. More likely, the losing party—the mine operator in 
Scenario Two and the miner in Scenario Three—would appeal the 
Commission’s final order. In that situation, it is unlikely that the party 
aggrieved by the temporary reinstatement order but ultimately victorious on 
the discrimination claim would be able to present arguments against the 
Commission’s temporary reinstatement decision on appeal. Ultimately, 
even if the parties overcame these procedural curiosities, they face the same 
hurdles as the parties appealing in Scenarios One and Four.  
B. Scenarios One and Four 
Scenarios One and Four are more favorable for the party aggrieved by 
the temporary reinstatement order because unlike Scenarios Two and Three, 
the party is at least afforded an opportunity to present arguments against the 
Commission’s decision on appeal. In Scenario Two, during the appeal of 
the Commission’s order finding discrimination, the mine operator may raise 
arguments regarding the initial temporary reinstatement order. Conversely, 
in Scenario Three, during the appeal of the Commission’s order denying 
discrimination, the miner may raise arguments regarding the denial of the 
initial temporary reinstatement order. Having a forum to present the 
arguments, however, does not guarantee that the reviewing court will 
entertain the arguments or have the ability to grant relief.  
In both scenarios, the appealing party faces the prospect that the 
reviewing court’s jurisdiction is limited in some respect. For example, the 
court’s jurisdiction may be limited to review of the final merits decision 
because temporary reinstatement orders are not final decisions reviewable 
under § 816 of the Mine Act. Alternatively, the reviewing court’s 
jurisdiction may not be limited because the two procedures are sufficiently 
related to permit review of both. Ultimately, the court’s interpretation of the 
procedures may impact whether the appealing party can raise their 
arguments regarding the temporary reinstatement order during the appeal of 
the Commission’s final decision. 
Assuming the circuit court allows the temporary reinstatement order 
arguments on appeal, neither the mine operator nor the miner’s injury is 
fully re-dressable.176 For the mine operator in Scenario One, even if a court 
finds that the miner was erroneously reinstated, no procedural mechanism 
exists that would allow the mine operator to recover the wages paid to the 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Id. at 95.  
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miner while the miner was temporarily reinstated.177 Conversely, for the 
miner in Scenario Four, even if the reviewing court finds that Commission 
improperly denied the temporary reinstatement order, any recovered wages 
do not redress the full extent of the miner’s injury.178 The purpose of the 
orders is two-fold: to provide temporary economic relief to miners bringing 
discrimination claims and to encourage miners to engage in protected 
activities without subjecting themselves to financial vulnerability.179 If a 
miner is only able to recover lost wages, the true force of the orders is never 
realized.  
1. More than Dollars and Cents 
Even if the injury suffered by the mine operator as a result of a 
temporary reinstatement order is purely financial, for the miners, the 
interest protected by the temporary reinstatement order is more than dollars 
and cents. As the Mine Act’s legislative history indicates, the purpose of 
temporary reinstatements orders is to incentivize enforcement of the Mine 
Act by providing economic protection to miners terminated for engaging in 
protected activities.180 Much like qualified immunity exists to protect 
officials acting in a discretionary capacity from litigation,181 temporary 
reinstatement orders exist to protect miners who are inherently vulnerable 
to discriminatory termination.182 And in the same way qualified immunity 
incentivizes officials to use their discretion without the fear of suit, 
temporary reinstatement orders incentivize miners to hold their employers 
responsible for substandard working conditions without the fear of losing 
their jobs. Fearing that a temporary reinstatement order may not be granted 
and knowing that the decision is unreviewable, future miners may be 
deterred from complying with the Mine Act.183 Ultimately, the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion deprives the Mine Act of its best enforcement mechanism.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. (“As counsel for the Secretary conceded, no procedure exists that allows an 
operator to recoup wages paid to a temporarily reinstated miner for all periods before a final 
merits decision.”).  
 178. Id. at 96. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. (referencing S. REP. NO. 95–181, at 37 (1977)).  
 181. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009). 
 182. Cobra Nat. Res., LLC, 742 F.3d at 96, 99 (Agee, J., dissenting).  
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In sum, the Fourth Circuit’s decision should be rejected as an improper 
departure from its sister circuits. By holding that temporary reinstatement 
orders fail each prong of the collateral order doctrine, the Fourth Circuit 
misconstrues the reach of the tolling affirmative defense, narrowly 
construes the Supreme Court’s discussion of the doctrine’s severability 
requirement, and fails to consider the impact on all interests impacted by 
the decision. Even further, the Fourth Circuit thwarts Congress’s specific 
intent of enforcing safe mining practices by undermining the Mine Act’s 
primary enforcement mechanism. Based on this opinion, miners must now 
be cautious in their compliance with the Mine Act or else they risk losing 
their livelihood without a second thought by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
 
Lindsay N. Kistler 
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